The Efficiency of Institutions: Political Determinants of Oil Consumption in Democracies by Duffield, John S. & Hankla, Charles R.
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Political Science Faculty Publications Department of Political Science
2011
The Efficiency of Institutions: Political
Determinants of Oil Consumption in Democracies
John S. Duffield
Georgia State University, duffield@gsu.edu
Charles R. Hankla
Georgia State University, chankla@gsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_facpub
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Science at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Duffield, John S. and Hankla, Charles R., "The Efficiency of Institutions: Political Determinants of Oil Consumption in Democracies"
(2011). Political Science Faculty Publications. 16.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_facpub/16
1 
 
The Efficiency of Institutions: 
 
Political Determinants of Oil Consumption in Democracies 
 
 
 
John S. Duffield and Charles R. Hankla 
 
Department of Political Science 
Georgia State University 
Atlanta, GA 
 
 
 
Forthcoming from Comparative Politics 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Oil consumption has varied significantly among democracies, but scholars have not 
systematically studied the political determinants of this variation.  We examine the effects of 
political institutions on a democratic country’s propensity to consume oil.  We argue that, other 
things being equal, more centralized national political institutions facilitate the adoption of 
policies that lower oil intensity.  Our primary focus is on the impact of veto players, but we also 
consider electoral systems, party organization, and legislative-executive relations separately.  We 
evaluate our hypotheses with a TSCS analysis of all democracies since the first oil shock in 1973 
(contingent on data availability), and we make use of an error correction model to separate short- 
and long-term effects and to correct for the non-stationarity of the dependent variable.  We find 
strong support for the hypothesized link between numerous veto players and slower reductions in 
oil intensity as well as weaker support for the influence of party decentralization. 
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Energy consumption is an important determinant of state interests, and since the early 1960s oil 
has accounted for roughly 40 percent of global energy use. Even in 2008, despite a relative 
decline in oil’s share to 34.8 percent over the previous decade, it still surpassed coal (29.3 
percent) and natural gas (24.1 percent) as an energy source.  Moreover, outside of China, which 
still relies on coal to meet some 70 percent of its energy needs, oil continues to provide for more 
than 38 percent of the world’s primary energy consumption.1  At the same time, oil consumption 
has varied substantially across states, even when controlling for population or economic output.  
For example, oil consumption per capita has typically been much higher in the United States than 
in France, Japan, or even the United Kingdom, another major oil producer. 
 Such variations in oil consumption can have important implications for the policies and 
well-being of states.  Other things being equal, levels of consumption can affect the relative 
competitiveness of oil-dependent sectors and industries, especially during times of high oil 
prices.  Likewise, countries that use more oil can suffer more from disruptions in world oil 
markets, and more vulnerable states may be more inclined to use extreme measures to ensure 
access to oil supplies.
2
 
 What accounts for variations in national oil consumption?  Surprisingly, this question, 
despite its political importance, has rarely been asked by political scientists, and it has never 
been satisfactorily answered.  Scholars have conducted few, if any, systematic studies of the 
political factors that determine a country’s propensity to consume oil.  That is the goal of this 
article.  We seek to explain the potentially consequential variation in oil consumption across 
democracies.  In particular, we seek to account for differences in reductions in oil intensity since 
the first oil shock sent prices skyrocketing and created uncertainty about oil supplies. 
 As a first step, we control for structural and economic variables that may be expected to 
3 
 
affect oil intensity.  The core of the paper, however, focuses on how national political institutions 
might affect oil intensity through government policy.  Our broad argument is that lower levels of 
oil intensity have been a public good, at least since the mid-1970s, and that more centralized 
political institutions in democracies facilitate the aggregation of societal interests into policies 
that foster a lowering of oil intensity.  
 We draw on the political economy literature to derive hypotheses about domestic political 
institutions that may be expected to impact oil use.  Our primary focus is on veto players, but for 
robustness, we also consider the effects three particular types of political institutions: electoral 
systems, party organization, and legislative-executive relations.  We then evaluate our 
hypotheses with a time-series cross-sectional analysis of all democracies over the thirty-four year 
period (1974-2007) following the first oil shock.  We make use of an error correction model to 
separate short- and long-term effects as well as to correct for the non-stationarity of the 
dependent variable. 
Our results provide strong and robust support for our primary hypothesis concerning the 
role of veto players, demonstrating that democracies with more veto players tend to have more 
difficulty reducing oil intensity.  We also find evidence that more decentralized parties are 
associated with less conservation as expected, although the results are less robust than for veto 
players.  Contrary to our expectations, however, we find no evidence that the electoral rule has a 
systematic effect on oil use or that systems in which political power is more concentrated in the 
executive are better able to reduce oil consumption. Thus we conclude that our findings, overall, 
provide further confirmation of the contribution of political institutions to the provision of public 
goods in general.  But they also indicate the need for further theoretical and empirical 
investigation of the processes through which such institutions can promote reduced oil intensity 
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and other specific types of policies that benefit society as a whole.  
 
I. Oil Consumption Across Democracies and Years 
  
 World oil consumption has grown by more than 150 percent since 1965.3  The oil-
consuming behavior of democracies is of particular interest, however, because many of them 
have exhibited the highest per capita levels of oil consumption.  And with just a couple of 
exceptions – the USSR/Russia and China –democracies have routinely filled the ranks of the 
largest overall oil users and, as consumers, have exerted the biggest impact on world oil markets.  
Thus oil consumption trends in democracies are especially important for understanding global 
tendencies. 
   Perhaps the most useful overall indicator of oil consumption for comparative purposes is 
oil intensity, which  is calculated by dividing total oil consumption by gross domestic product 
(GDP).  It describes the amount of oil needed to produce a dollar of economic output and thus 
controls for differences in total oil consumption due to changes in the amount of economic 
activity alone.  Consequently, we focus our analysis on explaining cross-national differences and 
temporal changes in oil intensity.
4
  Because oil intensity is a measure of efficiency, it should 
reflect the effects of government efforts to promote conservation, our primary theoretical 
interest.  
How has oil consumption varied among democracies over time?  For illustrative 
purposes, we offer a brief description of trends since 1965 in twenty-one OECD countries, which 
constitute the majority of the democratic country-years that have existed over this period.  
Although the average oil intensity for these countries rose in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
5 
 
Figure 1 reveals a clear downward trend between 1973 and 2007.  The average oil intensity 
dropped from 170.1 metric tons of oil per million dollars of GDP (in constant 2000 dollars) in 
1973 to 80.9 in 2007.   
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 Nevertheless, these trends should not be allowed to obscure major differences across the 
states.  For example, U.S. oil intensity has averaged about 50 percent higher than that of France 
and of the UK, and about twice that of Japan.  Canadian oil intensity has been even higher.  In 
1965, oil intensity levels among these illustrative cases ranged from a high of 242.3 (Canada) to 
a low of 62.4 (Switzerland), and in 2007, the highest level (155.0 in Belgium) was nearly four 
times as great as the lowest (40.9 in Switzerland again). 
 
II. Economic and Structural Determinants of Oil Intensity 
 
What factors best account for these patterns and variations of oil intensity in democracies?  Like 
other economic phenomena such as trade, much of oil consumption can presumably be explained 
by economic and structural conditions that are beyond the immediate control of government 
policy.  Among the conditions with the greatest promise to explain oil intensity are the cost of 
oil, national income, sectoral composition, population density, and energy self-sufficiency. 
 In market economies, oil costs money.  Consequently, when the cost of oil rises, we 
expect overall consumption to fall.  We also expect oil intensity to decrease, although not to the 
same extent, since the decline in oil consumption might be accompanied by some decrease in 
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economic activity. 
 
H1: As the cost of oil rises, oil intensity will decrease. 
 
 The cost of oil is counterbalanced by national income.  As people’s incomes increase, 
they tend to buy more goods and services.  Thus we expect that oil intensity will rise with 
average individual income, as measured by GDP per capita.  As countries grow yet richer and 
more technologically advanced, however, we might also expect energy efficiency to increase, 
and at some point, efficiency gains should begin to outpace increases in consumption, resulting 
in lower levels of oil intensity. 
 
H2: As national income increases, oil intensity will exhibit a curvilinear form, first 
increasing and then decreasing. 
 
 The cost of oil and national income will influence oil consumption across the board.  Oil 
intensity will also depend on the sectoral composition of the economy, however.  In particular, 
we expect the agricultural and, especially, the industrial sectors to be more oil intensive than the 
service sector as a general rule. 
 
 H3: As the share of the economy devoted to industry and agriculture (vis-à-vis services) 
increases, oil intensity will increase. 
 
Other factors will have the greatest impact in particular end-use sectors, which include 
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transportation, industry, and the commercial and residential sectors.  One such factor is 
population density.  Much oil is consumed in the process of moving people and goods from place 
to place.  Indeed, the transportation sector accounts for a high percentage (approximately two-
thirds in the United States, for example) of all oil consumption.
5
  The demand for transportation 
is in turn influenced by the distribution of a country’s population.    We expect that the more 
concentrated the population is, the lower oil consumption and oil intensity should be. 
 
H4: As population density increases, oil intensity will decrease. 
 
 Finally, we expect oil consumption to be influenced by the degree to which a state 
depends on oil imports.  Although oil markets have become increasingly integrated over the 
years, oil produced domestically may be available to users at lower prices and with greater 
certainty than oil from other sources. 
 
H5: As oil consumption produced domestically increases, oil intensity will increase. 
  
III.  Political Determinants of Oil Intensity 
 
Generally, we expect markets to determine the level of national oil consumption, except where 
governments seek to promote or discourage it for social reasons.  Oil consumption can have a 
variety of negative economic, security, and even environmental externalities.
6
  Consequently, 
central governments may have an incentive to adopt policies intended to reduce those costs, 
largely by achieving lower levels of oil intensity. 
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 These incentives have been especially pronounced since the first oil shock.  The 1973-
1974 oil crisis saw a quadrupling of the price of crude oil, resulting in massive wealth transfers 
to oil exporting countries, and raised questions about the security of oil supplies.  In reaction, 
most governments have made efforts to reduce oil consumption over the years, while at the same 
time protecting their countries against possible disruptions of foreign oil supplies.  Beyond 
increasing the energy efficiency of their own operations, however, governments in market 
economies exercise little direct control over aggregate consumption.  Instead, they may 
incentivize or require other oil users to reduce consumption and to use energy more efficiently.  
Among the policy tools at their disposal have been taxes and tax incentives; regulations for the 
efficiency of motor vehicles and other oil-consuming devices; and, at a more general level, 
incentives for promoting a shift to less oil-intensive economic activities.
7
  Other government 
policies may seek to reduce oil imports by increasing domestic oil production and to minimize 
the short-term economic impact of oil supply disruptions, for example, by creating strategic 
stockpiles. 
Nevertheless, the precise combination of policies pursued by democracies since the first 
oil shock has varied substantially. For example, U.S. efforts to reduce oil consumption have 
emphasized the establishment of vehicle fuel economy standards, while European countries have 
maintained much higher taxes on petroleum-based fuels.
8
  And arguably, national efforts to 
reduce oil consumption have enjoyed varying degrees of success, at least judging by continuing 
differences in levels of oil intensity.  Assuming that these differences cannot be entirely 
attributed to economic and structural factors such as those identified above, what political factors 
might help to account for them?  Why, in particular, might different governments have been 
more or less able to influence levels of oil consumption and efficiency? 
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 One way to approach this question is to regard such policies as generating public goods.  
Many of the benefits that these policies yield, in terms of reducing the economic, environmental, 
and national security costs of oil consumption, accrue to society as a whole.  Thus the adoption 
of policies that, among other things, reduce oil intensity is related to the ability of governments 
to provide public goods. 
 The ability of democracies to provide such policies and the resulting benefits, where they 
may be desirable, varies.  In particular, not all democratic governments are equally able to take 
measures that would result in significant decreases in oil consumption.  Representative 
governments are constrained to varying degrees by society and private interests.  Society in the 
aggregate might benefit from such measures, but particular sectors and groups will inevitably be 
hurt by particular policies and thus are likely to oppose them.  For example, oil-intensive 
industries and even consumers as a whole are unlikely to support higher taxes on oil and 
petroleum products.  Likewise, the manufacturers of oil-consuming devices, such as the auto 
companies, are likely to resist costly regulations intended to increase fuel efficiency.  Thus 
success in adopting and implementing energy policies may depend on the ability of governments 
to take unpopular measures that may nevertheless serve the common good and to resist the 
pressures generated by special interests and other concentrated pockets of domestic opposition. 
 Under what conditions, in fact, are governments in representative democracies most 
likely to be able to provide such policies?  We argue that more centralized political institutions 
enable governments to adopt policies that promote lower levels of oil intensity that would tend to 
advance the overall interests of the state and society.
9
  Centralized political institutions are less 
likely to be constrained by special interests that would resist conservation policies.  Of course, 
the institutions must also be democratic in character, as the theorized link between centralization 
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and energy conservation depends critically on the electoral connection.  Autocrats would have no 
incentive to respond to the interests of citizens for public goods, although they may have their 
own reasons for reducing their countries’ oil consumption.  Because there is no systematic 
literature on the role of political institutions in shaping energy policy, we draw heavily on the 
broad political economy literature to develop our more specific hypotheses below.   
  
A. Veto Players and Political Constraints 
We focus our attention on the relationship between oil intensity and the number and diversity of 
policy-making veto players, which is perhaps the most general measure of political institutional 
centralization and constraint.  The role of veto players in policy-making has been most 
thoroughly theorized by Tsebelis, who argues that as the number of individuals or institutions 
with veto power over policy increases, the likelihood of policy change declines.
10
  The logic is 
straightforward.  When more political actors must agree to a policy reform, the probability of one 
of them preferring the status quo and thus blocking change increases.  This effect should be 
particularly likely when the relevant veto players are ideologically diverse, as in divided or 
coalition government. 
 The importance of veto players to policy stasis has been tested across a wide variety of 
policy arenas, with broad empirical support.  For example, in the trade literature, Henisz and 
Mansfield find that the effect of deteriorating macroeconomic conditions on trade openness is 
mediated by the number of a country’s veto players.11  Similarly, Haggard and Kaufman argue 
that economic reform will be harder in transitional democracies with fragmented and polarized 
party systems, and Hallerberg finds that states with more veto players (i.e., federal, multiparty 
systems) are less able to use independent monetary and fiscal policies effectively.
12
  In addition, 
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Spruyt has shown that the difficulty or ease of decolonization was greatly determined by the 
number of veto players in the governments of the former imperial powers, and a number of 
authors in the budgetary politics literature have found a robust and significant link between the 
size of government coalitions in parliamentary systems and the ability to rein in deficit 
spending.
13
 
 Theoretically, we expect that countries with fewer and less diverse veto players will be 
more likely to adopt policies that successfully reduce oil consumption and intensity.  In countries 
with multiple, diverse veto players, the incentives to improve efficiency provided by concerns 
about the price and availability of oil are less likely to be transformed into successful 
conservation policies because status quo interests that would be harmed are more likely to 
obstruct policy change.   
 
H6:  Democracies with fewer and less diverse veto players (i.e., fewer political 
constraints) will be more likely to reduce oil intensity. 
 
B. Other Political Institutions 
For robustness, we also examine the possible impact of three other particular types of national 
institutions that have been studied in the wider political economy literature: electoral systems, 
party organization, and legislative-executive relations.  These institutions are, of course, among 
the components of the veto player concept (although not necessarily of the Political Constraints 
variable that we use to operationalize the concept).  Our broad intuition is that, when these 
democratic institutions are more centralized, governments will be better able to introduce 
policies that reduce oil intensity. 
12 
 
 
1. Electoral Systems 
We begin with electoral systems, which play a key role in the process of interest representation.  
The basic argument here is that the broader and more diverse the set of interests an elected 
official must represent, the more likely she is to support policies that provide public goods.  By 
contrast, the more decentralized and fragmented the interests that she represents, the more likely 
she will be to advocate for local, private goods.  We derive this argument primarily from the 
literature on trade policy, where a number of studies have found an association between electoral 
district size and open trade.  Rogowski’s approach to the question is particularly relevant for our 
purposes.
14
  In his analysis of OECD countries, Rogowski argued that democracies that are more 
dependent on trade generally choose large, proportional electoral districts as opposed to small, 
single-member districts.   This is because, for Rogowski, the lobbying power of concentrated 
protectionist interests will be greatly increased in small, single member electoral districts.  By 
contrast, providing public goods, such as free trade, may be a more efficient way to ensure 
reelection in larger, proportional districts, where the collective interest more closely 
approximates the national interest in free trade.
 15
   
 A number of other scholars have found support for the role of constituency size in trade 
policy outcomes, although some, more recently, have not.
16
   This disagreement notwithstanding, 
there is ample reason to believe that the argument may apply equally well to oil intensity.  In this 
scenario, the collective interests of larger, proportional electoral districts would better 
approximate the national interest in reducing energy intensity, whereas particularistic interests 
that oppose reductions would have significant lobbying power in smaller districts.  This 
argument leads us to our fifth hypothesis: 
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H7: Democracies with larger, proportional electoral districts will be more likely to reduce 
oil intensity. 
 
2. Party Organization 
Even in electoral systems that foster the fragmentation of interest representation through the use 
of small, single member electoral districts, this tendency can be counteracted by the institutional 
characteristics of political parties.  In particular, the stronger a political party is, the better able it 
is to aggregate interests and, when in power, to provide public goods. 
 The systematic study of party organization and public policy is relatively new in the 
political economy literature.  It received a significant boost when Carey and Shugart developed a 
way to measure an individual legislator’s “incentive to cultivate a personal vote” rather than 
follow the policies of national party leaders, based on such factors as party nomination power 
and electoral system characteristics.
17
  Since the publication of this measure, at least three 
scholars have used various applications of it to examine the provision of public policies.  Nielson 
examined 18 developing countries and found that centralized parties (which rein in the personal 
vote) are more likely to liberalize their trade policies.
18
  Similarly, Hallerberg and Marier 
identified an association (mediated by executive strength) between centralized parties and 
balanced budgets in Latin American democracies.
19
  And Hankla expanded the analysis to 81 
developed and developing democracies and also found support for the relationship between 
centralized parties and freer trade.
20
  The logic of these three arguments is similar: centralized 
party leaders have an incentive to provide public goods because of their national constituency, 
whereas individual legislators have a greater incentive to provide private goods.  As a result, 
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when central party leaders are empowered and individual party members are constrained, the 
provision of public goods such as free trade or balanced budgets becomes more likely.  We apply 
this logic directly to reductions in oil intensity: 
 
H8: Democracies with more centralized parties will be more likely to reduce oil intensity. 
 
3. Legislative-Executive Relations 
We turn finally to possible links between legislative-executive relations and oil intensity.  We 
assume that, among democracies, national executives will tend to have broad, national 
constituencies, whereas individual legislators will generally represent more particularistic 
interests.21  Therefore, we expect that when national decision-making is centralized in an 
executive, and when that executive is controlled by a single individual or party, the provision of 
public goods, such as lower oil intensity, will be easier. 
 This expectation is supported by numerous findings in the political economy literature.  
In his examination of Latin American countries, for example, Nielson finds that delegation to 
presidents is associated with lower tariffs.
22
  Using a similar logic, Hallerberg and Marier and 
Franzese find that strong presidents are generally associated with more balanced budgets.
23
  
Haggard and Kaufman argue that, because of their relative insulation, strong executives can 
facilitate economic reforms in newly democratized countries, at least in the short run.
24
  And 
scholars of the developmental state generally find that more insulated government institutions 
facilitate the disciplining of capital and labor necessary to promote the public’s long term interest 
in economic growth.
25
   Because executives, whether elected directly or by a parliament, have 
national or semi-national constituencies, they should be more insulated from interest group 
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pressure. 
 The well-developed literature on the role of executive preference and divided government 
on American trade policy outcomes arrives at similar findings.  Keech and Pak demonstrate 
empirically that American Presidents, regardless of party, have advocated some degree of trade 
liberalization.
26
  Moreover, a number of scholars have suggested that when Congress and the 
Presidency are controlled by different parties, there will be a protectionist bias in policy.  This 
outcome could result from the reluctance of Congress to delegate “fast track” or trade promotion 
authority to a President of the opposing party.
27
  As a result, Congress will retain greater control 
over trade and, because of its greater openness and proclivity to logrolling, protection will likely 
increase.  While several scholars, most recently Karol, have questioned this argument, few have 
challenged the fundamental notion of the free-trading president.
28
   
 The same general logic should apply to parliamentary systems.  When coalition 
governments are in power, public goods should be in shorter supply than when single party 
governments hold sway.  The budget literature on party fragmentation, discussed above with 
respect to veto players, has borne out this argument in a number of studies.
29
  It is, however, 
important to realize that the precise nature of the relationship between unified government and 
public goods provision may vary between parliamentary and presidential systems, and so they 
should be analyzed separately.
30
  These considerations suggest the following hypotheses: 
 
 H9:  Presidential democracies will be more likely to reduce oil intensity under unified 
than under divided government. 
 H10:  Parliamentary democracies will be more likely to reduce oil intensity under single-
party than under coalition government. 
16 
 
 
IV. Statistical Analysis 
 
A. Model 
 
We ask how well the various factors identified above can explain longitudinal and cross-national 
variations in oil intensity.  We are especially interested in understanding how effectively 
different democracies have been able to reduce oil intensity after the first oil shock drove up the 
price of oil around the world and raised concerns about the security of oil supplies.  To 
accomplish these goals, we analyze all democracies over the period 1974-2007, contingent on 
data availability.
31
 We begin our analysis in 1974 because it was only after the first oil shock that 
oil consumption became a major political issue.  We make the assumption that the political, 
economic, and strategic pressure for oil conservation remained relatively constant during our 
period of analysis.  While this is not strictly true, it would be difficult to operationalize the cross-
temporal variation in pressure and, more to the point, the wide variety of conservation policies 
employed by the states could take anywhere from a few weeks (price incentives) to years 
(mileage standards) to manifest.  As a result, a simple post-1973 additive model is the best option 
for testing our arguments. 
 To analyze our data, we make use of an error correction model, a very useful technique 
that is only now finding its way into the political science literature.32  Two factors motivate this 
choice, one econometric and the other theoretical.  First, our dependent variable (Y), oil 
intensity, is non-stationary for the country-years we consider, exhibiting a downward trend for 
most countries.  This non-stationarity presents a variety of complex estimation problems that are 
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most easily resolved by differencing our dependent variable.  Second, the use of an error 
correction model allows us to distinguish between the short- and long-term effects of some of 
our independent variables (X) on the dependent variable.  The coefficient of a differenced 
independent variable (diffX) estimates the effect of a change in that variable on a change in the 
dependent variable (diffY), a relationship that can be termed the short-run impact of X on Y.  
The coefficient of a non-differenced independent variable, by contrast, estimates the effect of the 
value of X on changes in Y, or, put differently, the variable’s long run effect. 
 In the error correction model, then, our dependent variable becomes differenced oil 
intensity.  Following the standard estimation for error correction models, we include the lagged 
level of the dependent variable in the estimation to control for the impact of the size of oil 
intensity on its change.  We also include both the differenced and lagged non-differenced values 
of our economic independent variables on the right side of the equation.  We do not, however, 
difference our political variables because they vary very little across time. 
 
B. Operationalization of the Variables 
 
1. Dependent Variables 
We operationalize our primary dependent variable as the annual change in oil intensity (Diff Oil 
Intensity).  It is calculated by dividing oil consumption (in metric tons) from the British 
Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of World Energy by gross domestic product (in millions of 
constant 2000 US dollars) from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).33.  To 
test for robustness, we also make use of the annual change in a country’s overall energy intensity 
(Diff Energy Intensity), which we expect to be influenced in similar ways by the economic, 
structural, and political variables, as a dependent variable.  Indeed, energy intensity in the OECD 
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countries has also declined more or less steadily since 1973, although by only about two-thirds as 
much as has oil intensity.  We calculate this variable from data for primary energy consumption 
(in the same units) from BP and GDP per capita data (in millions of constant 2000 US dollars) 
from the World Bank.  Overall energy consumption, of course, includes not only oil but also 
other fossil fuels, nuclear power, and renewable sources of energy.  If our independent variables 
prove to be significant across both operationalizations, we will have even stronger evidence in 
support of our arguments. 
 
2. Economic and Structural Variables 
To measure the price of oil, we use data from BP for crude oil prices per barrel in constant U.S. 
dollars.  We expect both the lagged and differenced oil price variables (Lag World Price and Diff 
World Price) to have a negative association with oil intensity.
34
   
 We take all of our remaining economic and structural variables from the World Bank.
35
  
We measure the long-term effects of increasing income on oil intensity using the lagged natural 
log of GDP per capita and the lagged squared natural log of GDP per capita in constant dollars 
(Lag lnGDPpc and Lag SqlnGDPpc).  We difference these variables to capture the short-term 
effects of growing income (Diff lnGDPpc and Diff SqlnGDPpc).
36
  As noted in H1, we expect 
increases in the level of GDP per capita to have a positive effect on oil intensity for less 
developed countries and a negative effect for developed countries.
37
  Similarly, to measure the 
effect of sectoral composition on oil intensity, we use measures for the share of gross national 
income attributable to industry (Lag Percent Industry) and agriculture (Lag Percent Agriculture), 
using the service sector as the reference category.  We expect oil intensity to increase with 
industry share in particular, and also probably with agricultural share.  We include both the 
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lagged and differenced values of both variables in the model. 
 To measure the long-term impact of population concentration on oil intensity, we use 
overall population density (Lag Pop Density), or the average number of people per square 
kilometer.  Other things being equal, lower population densities mean a greater need for 
transportation.  We use differenced population density (Diff Pop Density) to capture the short-
term impact of increasing population density (identical to population growth in the absence of 
territorial acquisition or loss) on oil intensity.   
 Next, we seek to control for the share of oil produced domestically.  Because data on oil 
production are not available for many of our cases, we use as a proxy intensity of energy 
production (total domestic energy production in metric tons of oil equivalent divided by gross 
domestic product in millions of constant 2000 US dollars).  We expect overall energy production 
to correlate with oil production and thus for oil intensity to increase as intensity of energy 
production goes up, other things being equal.  As usual, we include both lagged and differenced 
values of the variable in the model.  Finally, to control for cultural factors and for the regional 
dissemination of ideas, we include dummy variables for North and Central America, South 
America, Oceania, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
Asia, with Western Europe as our omitted variable.
38
  These regional dummies can also be used 
to control for the possible effects of European Union membership, although the overlap between 
the EU and the Western Europe dummy is imperfect.  Basic data relating to the economic and 
structural control variables can be found in Table 1. 
 
3. Political Variables 
We evaluate our primary political hypothesis, the relationship between veto players and oil 
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intensity, using the fifth political constraint variable developed by Henisz.
39
  This variable 
provides an aggregate measure of the degree to which the formation of policy is constrained by 
(1) the presence of multiple veto gates, including the executive, two possible chambers of the 
legislature, the judiciary, and sub-federal units and (2) the control of these veto gates by 
ideologically dissimilar parties.  Political systems with more veto gates, as well as those systems 
where veto gates are controlled by more ideologically heterogeneous parties, will score higher on 
the variable (Political Constraints), which can range between “0" and “1". 
To operationalize party organization, we make use of the data set developed by Hankla, 
which is based on Carey and Shugart’s ballot variable.40  Our variable Party Decentralization is 
coded “1" when party leaders have little influence over legislative candidate selection (as in 
primary systems), and “0" when their influence is significant.  Control over the ballot is among 
the most important sources of party centralization. 
We operationalize our remaining political variables using the Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI).
41
  To measure electoral district size and proportionality, we use the HouseSys 
variable, which is coded “1” when the majority of seats in a country’s lower house are elected by 
plurality vote, “0” when they are elected under proportional representation, and “0.5” when seats 
are evenly divided between the two.  To test our theoretical expectations linking centralized, 
executive decision-making with lower oil intensity, we create dummy variables for divided 
presidential government (Divided Pres Govt), unified presidential government (Unified Pres 
Govt), and coalition parliamentary government (Coalition Parl Govt).   These variables are based 
on the interaction of DPI’s AllHouse dummy, coded “1” when the party of the executive controls 
all relevant legislative houses, with DPI’s System variable, coded “1” for presidential 
governments.
42
  Our omitted variable is of course majoritarian parliamentary systems. 
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 We estimate one set of regressions for the veto player (Political Constraints) models, and 
another for the models evaluating the other political institutions.  This approach is reasonable 
because the Political Constraints variable encompasses many of the more specific political 
institutions that we are considering.  To estimate these models, we use random effects regression, 
a technique that allows us to consider the panel structure of the data in both our point estimates 
and our standard errors, but which is also compatible with our often time-invariant political 
variables.    We also make use of fixed effects regression to verify the robustness of our veto 
player models, as there is sufficient temporal variation present.  Summary statistics for our 
variables are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
V. Results 
 
Table 2 presents the results of our models. In it, we report three Political Constraints models 
(random and fixed effects models with Diff Oil Intensity as the dependent variable and a random 
effects model with Diff Energy Intensity as the dependent variable) and two models testing our 
additional political variables (a random effects model with Diff Oil Intensity as the dependent 
variable and another using Diff Energy Intensity).  The results provide strong support for our 
primary political hypothesis (H6) – that, in the post 1973 world, democracies with fewer veto 
players have been better able to reduce their dependence on oil.  The variable Political 
Constraints is significant at the 1% level for our primary oil intensity model with random effects 
and at the 5% level for both the oil intensity fixed effects and the energy intensity models.  Its 
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effect is also substantively important, leading to an increase in oil intensity of about 9 metric tons 
of oil per million dollars across its range, just over half a standard deviation.   
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 The results also provide support for most of the economic hypotheses that we identified 
in the theory section.  In both of the oil intensity models, higher oil prices reduce oil 
consumption as expected in H1, although surprisingly the effect seems to be primarily a long run 
effect (as evidenced by the insignificance of differenced price).  By contrast, the price variables 
are insignificant in the energy intensity models, perhaps because higher oil prices may both lead 
countries to consume more of other types of energy and dampen economic activity, with a net 
neutral effect on overall energy intensity.   
 As expected, in two of the three models, higher levels and faster growth of domestic 
energy production are associated with greater oil and energy intensity; in only one model are the 
effects not statistically significant.  This finding indicates that states that can produce more of 
their own energy have fewer incentives to conserve, probably because they face fewer of the 
security externalities that arise from import dependence.  There is also evidence that, as 
agriculture and especially industry give way to services in modern democracies, oil and energy 
intensity decline.  This effect is stronger with the differenced variables, suggesting that it is a 
short term relationship that is more determined by shifts in economic structure than by the long 
term make-up of an economy.  Turning to the population density variables, growth in population 
density (equivalent to population growth in the absence of territorial change) is associated, as 
expected, with reductions in oil and energy intensity.    
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 In our primary model, oil intensity with random effects, higher levels of GDP per capita 
are significantly associated with increases in oil intensity whereas higher levels of squared GDP 
per capita are associated with decreases.  This finding, also strongly present in our primary 
model testing the additional political variables, is in keeping with H2, which predicts that 
national income should have a curvilinear effect on oil consumption.  In other words, we find 
evidence here that poorer countries in their early phases of growth use more oil, whereas richer 
countries, as they become even richer, find new ways to conserve.  In the remaining models, it is 
the differenced GDP per capita variables that are significant, indicating that fast growth is 
associated with less efficiency and slow growth with more.  This finding is compatible with the 
previous one as developing democracies tend to experience more rapid changes in GDP growth 
than richer democracies.     
 Turning now to the models testing our additional political variables, we find support for 
the hypothesized relationship (H8) between party decentralization and higher oil intensity.  The 
Party Decentralization variable is strongly significant (at the 1% level) in our primary oil 
intensity model, with the predicted effect substantively important.  Democracies with 
decentralized parties will, on average, see greater reductions in oil intensity by over one-third a 
standard deviation.  We do not, however, find support for the Party Decentralization variable in 
our energy intensity robustness test, calling into question the robustness of the relationship.   
 The results for the divided presidential government (Divided Pres Govt), unified 
presidential government (Unified Pres Govt), and coalition parliamentary government (Coalition 
Parl Govt) dummies indicate that single party control of the legislature has no significant effect 
on oil intensity in parliamentary systems.  Moreover, presidential systems with divided 
governments are found to be more inclined to conservation than other types of systems.  These 
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surprising findings are less robust than our findings for Political Constraint, however, as they are 
significant in the primary oil intensity model but not in the energy intensity model.  
 Finally, we find no evidence to support the hypothesized relationship between electoral 
proportionality and energy conservation (H5), with the HouseSys variable insignificant in both 
models.  Future research could usefully try a wider variety of indicators, but, as noted before, the 
precise effects of the electoral system in other policy areas have been controversial. The results 
for our control variables in the additional political models generally accord with the results of the 
Political Constraints models. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Because the level of oil consumption and energy consumption more generally can have 
important economic, environmental, and security implications for states, it is important to 
understand their determinants.  We have examined the relationship between national political 
institutions and oil intensity in democracies.  In particular, we have tested the argument that 
more centralized political institutions have made it easier for democratic governments to reduce 
levels of oil intensity since the 1973-1974 oil crisis caused prices to jump dramatically and raised 
questions about the security of oil supplies. 
We have found that the most comprehensive measure of political institutional 
centralization, veto players, has a significant effect.  Lower levels of political constraint are 
significantly associated with larger decreases in oil and energy intensity.  Alternative political 
institutional variables yield mixed results.  Our measure of the decentralization of political 
parties is significant in the expected direction, suggesting that democracies with more centralized 
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parties have an easier time implementing policies that lower oil consumption. By contrast, we 
find no relationship between oil intensity and electoral system structure, a variable that has been 
questioned as a determinant of other policy outcomes but which we believe requires more testing 
before we can definitely reject it as a factor in energy policy.  Finally, our interactive measure of 
the centralization of power in the executive produced the surprising result that divided 
presidential systems are more likely to reduce oil intensity than other types of systems, although 
the effect is not as robust as that of veto players. 
Overall, these results provide further confirmation of the link between political 
institutions and cross-national differences in public goods provision.  Most of the research 
making this connection has developed in isolation, with trade politics scholars, budgetary politics 
scholars, and others producing arguments broadly independent of one another.  We extend these 
arguments to an understudied but important policy arena.  More than that, however, this article 
demonstrates the usefulness of crossing sub-field boundaries to expand our understanding of how 
political institutions factor into public policy. 
At the same time, our results leave unclear the precise mechanisms through which 
centralized political institutions foster the adoption of policies that result in lower levels of oil 
intensity in particular, and thus indicate the need for further investigation of these processes.  
Some answers may come from the development of better empirical measures of the different 
dimensions of democratic centralization explored here.  But greater attention to the operation of 
party, electoral, and policy-making institutions and how they may vary across democracies and 
across issue areas is also merited.  Likewise, we are unable to identify the effects and 
effectiveness of different types of policies for reducing oil intensity and the conditions, political 
or otherwise, that favor or militate against their adoption.  Given the particular methods 
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employed here, policy choices are endogenous to the analysis.  More fine-grained statistical 
techniques, involving the collection of detailed data on policy choices, or in-depth case study 
analysis will be necessary to shed light on these important issues. 
From a more practical perspective, this study also helps to identify the potential 
opportunities for and constraints on efforts aimed at increasing economic efficiency, protecting 
the environment, and promoting national security through energy policy in the future.  The 
advanced industrialized (OECD) democracies continue to account for more than 50 percent of 
the world’s energy consumption, and some 85 percent of the energy they use still comes from 
fossil fuels.
43
  Yet their incentives to reduce the use of oil and other fossil fuels are perhaps 
greater than ever.  Over the past decade, the price of oil, still the most widely used single energy 
source, has sustained its largest increase, in both absolute and percentage terms, since World 
War II.  Over the same period, prices for natural gas, the second most important fuel, have also 
risen substantially.
44
  Meanwhile, the advanced industrialized countries have come to depend 
increasingly on oil and gas imports from unstable or potentially hostile countries.  And concern 
about the negative environmental consequences of burning fossil fuels, especially climate 
change, has reached unprecedented levels. 
Some reductions in fossil fuel consumption have already come about simply as a result of 
higher prices and the heightened concerns of individuals about the negative environmental and 
security externalities of energy use.  But national policies will continue to play an important role 
in promoting conservation and energy efficiency.  As this study has shown, however, how 
successful democracies can be at using policy to reduce energy consumption and intensity will 
depend in part on their political institutions.  As a general rule, those with less centralized 
political institutions, especially in the form of larger numbers of more ideologically diverse veto 
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players, will find it more difficult to take strong measures. 
Indeed, there is some recent evidence to support this generalization.  Of the largest 
advanced industrialized democracies, France and the United Kingdom arguably enjoy the most 
centralized political institutions.  And in the last several years, first France and then the UK have 
developed comprehensive national energy policies.
45
  In contrast, the United States, where 
political authority is more diffuse, has thus far seen only piecemeal, and relatively limited, 
legislative efforts to address high energy prices, concerns about climate change, and dependence 
on foreign oil.
46
  Of course, it would be inappropriate to draw definitive conclusions from such 
limited observations.  And the differences in the degree of political constraint are not so great as 
to ensure that these countries are fated to follow completely different policy paths.  But it does 
suggest that efforts to promote greater energy efficiency and conservation through policy will 
face greater obstacles in some countries than others because of the relative efficiency of their 
political institutions. 
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Table 1: Summary of the Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Range (Min-Max) Mean St. Dev. 
Expected  
Effect on Y 
Diff Oil Intensity  -375 to 45.7 -2.95 16.9 N/A 
Diff Energy Intensity  -384 to 269 -5.08 35.9 N/A 
Lag Oil Intensity 47.1 to 1598 143 92.9 Negative 
Lag Energy Intensity  105 to 4560 388 474 Negative 
Political Constraints  0 to .894 .713 .153 Positive 
Unified Pres Govt 0 or 1 .509 .500 Uncertain 
Divided Pres Govt 0 or 1 .171 .377 Positive 
Coalition Parl Govt 0 or 1 .212 .409 Positive 
HouseSys 0 or 1 .373 .482 Positive 
Party Decentralization 0 or 1 .218 .413 Positive 
Diff World Price -27.0 to 47.7 .822 11.1 Negative 
Lag World Price 17.3 to 96.6 38.9 19.0 Negative 
Diff Energy Production -209 to 227 -1.88 30.6 Positive 
Lag Energy Production 5.97 to 2559 352 434 Positive 
Diff Percent Industry -12.5 to 13.8 -.245 1.65 Positive 
Lag Percent Industry 19.9 to 60.6 32.6 6.13 Positive 
Diff Percent Agriculture -7.72 to 10.4 -.279 .941 Positive 
Lag Percent Agriculture .963 to 38.0 7.75 7.07 Positive 
Diff Pop Density -1.50 to 21.5 1.05 2.71 Negative 
Lag Pop Density 1.83 to 1156 133 161 Negative 
Diff lnGDPpc -.172 to .150 .020 .033 Uncertain 
Lag lnGDPpc 5.39 to 10.6 9.00 1.22 Positive 
Diff SqlnGDPpc -2.76 to 2.52 .366 .550 Uncertain 
Lag SqlnGDPpc 29.0 to 112 82.4 20.4 Negative 
North & Central America 0 or 1 .068 .253 Uncertain 
South America 0 or 1 .126 .331 Uncertain 
Oceania 0 or 1 .058 .234 Uncertain 
Eastern Europe 0 or 1 .303 .460 Uncertain 
Middle East & North Africa 0 or 1 .027 .161 Uncertain 
Asia 0 or 1 .140 .347 Uncertain 
Africa 0 or 1 .011 .105 Uncertain 
Polity 6 to 10 9.21 1.15 N/A 
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Table 2: Results of the Models 
Variables 
Random 
Effects 
(Oil Intensity) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(Oil 
Intensity) 
Random 
Effects 
(Energy 
Intensity) 
Random 
Effects 
(Oil Intensity) 
Random 
Effects 
(Energy 
Intensity) 
Lag Level of Y 
    -.141*** 
(.006) 
    -.234*** 
(.018) 
     -.056*** 
(.004) 
     -.201*** 
(.007) 
-.043 
       (.005)*** 
Political Constraints 
  10.1*** 
(3.88) 
11.9** 
(5.87) 
16.3** 
(7.66) 
  
Unified Pres Govt 
   1.71 
(2.23) 
 .455 
(5.24) 
Divided Pres Govt 
        -6.98*** 
(2.36) 
-7.66 
 (5.58) 
Coalition Parl Govt 
   -0.822 
(1.48) 
 -.408 
(3.57) 
HouseSys 
   1.77 
(2.19) 
5.60 
(4.81) 
Party Decentral 
         5.59*** 
(2.13) 
3.17 
(4.28) 
Diff World Price 
-.056 
 (.040) 
-.038 
  (.040) 
-.036 
 (.080) 
-.001 
(.036) 
-.019 
 (.090) 
Lag World Price 
-.053* 
(.027) 
  -.071** 
(.030) 
-.030 
 (.054) 
     -.081*** 
(.024) 
-.002 
 (.060) 
Diff Energy Prod 
  .023* 
(.013) 
.014 
 (.015) 
      .245*** 
(.027) 
    .032** 
(.014) 
      .462*** 
(.035) 
Lag Energy Prod 
      .007*** 
(.002) 
-.002 
 (.005) 
     .012*** 
(.003) 
      .011*** 
(.002) 
      .026*** 
(.006) 
Diff Percent Industry 
    .649** 
(.276) 
    .577** 
(.282) 
  1.52*** 
(.554) 
. 071 
(.243) 
-.356 
 (.609) 
Lag Percent Industry 
-.055 
  (.114) 
. 078 
(.151) 
.024 
(.221) 
  .201* 
(.117) 
-.084 
(.277) 
Diff Percent Agric 
. 162 
(.466) 
.191 
(.470) 
   2.82*** 
(.937) 
-.633 
 (.429) 
1.47 
(1.08) 
Lag Percent Agric 
     . 335** 
(.168) 
. 151 
(.228) 
-.168 
 (.335) 
    .507** 
(.200) 
-.649 
(.475) 
Diff Pop Density 
   -.936** 
(.460) 
1.20 
(1.08) 
-.1.43 
(.941) 
  -1.62*** 
(.556) 
-1.62 
 (1.27) 
Lag Pop Density 
. 006 
(.008) 
 . 014 
(.041) 
. 017 
(.015) 
.009 
(.010) 
.031 
(.021) 
Diff lnGDPpc 
-187 
 (118) 
   -285** 
(122) 
     -709*** 
(231) 
 -291*** 
(99.9) 
    -1863*** 
(246) 
Lag lnGDPpc 
  35.6*** 
(9.17) 
15.2 
(26.2) 
   -8.12 
(18.2) 
      49.0*** 
(11.7) 
-.610 
(27.1) 
Diff SqlnGDPpc 
9.55 
(6.90) 
13.9* 
  (7.11) 
      37.2*** 
(13.6) 
13.8** 
(5.82) 
 101*** 
(14.4) 
Lag SqlnGDPpc 
 -2.34*** 
(.515) 
-1.92 
 (1.36) 
  -.075 
(1.01) 
  -3.26*** 
(.656) 
 -0.621 
(1.50) 
Regional Dummies Yes Dropped Yes Yes Yes 
N  985  985  985 929 929 
R2 .455 .293 .424 .513 .378 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10  All tests are 2-tailed.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
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Sources: BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009 (London: BP, 2009); World Bank, 
World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2009). 
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